Fordham Law Review
Volume 87

Issue 5

Article 15

2019

All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace: Border Searches
of Electronic Devices in the Digital Age
Sean O'Grady
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Fourth Amendment
Commons

Recommended Citation
Sean O'Grady, All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace: Border Searches of Electronic Devices in
the Digital Age, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 2255 (2019).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss5/15

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

ALL WATCHED OVER BY MACHINES OF
LOVING GRACE: BORDER SEARCHES OF
ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Sean O’Grady*
The border search exception to the Fourth Amendment has historically
given the U.S. government the right to conduct suspicionless searches of the
belongings of any individual crossing the border. The federal government
relies on the border search exception to search and detain travelers’
electronic devices at the border without a warrant or individualized
suspicion.
The government’s justification for suspicionless searches of electronic
devices under the traditional border search exception for travelers’ property
has recently been called into question in a series of federal court decisions.
In March 2013, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cotterman became the
first federal circuit court to rule that a border search of an electronic device
may require reasonable suspicion that its owner committed a crime due to
the privacy impact of such a search. The following year, in Riley v.
California (a nonborder search case), the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly
endorsed the view that searches of cell phones implicate privacy concerns
far beyond those implicated by searches of other physical items. Most
recently, two divergent circuit court decisions, United States v. Kolsuz and
United States v. Touset, lay bare the conflict in the federal circuit courts
between a view that border searches of electronic devices are no different
than those of other personal property and an emerging sense that digital
border searches merit additional scrutiny due to their increased likelihood
to harm travelers’ Fourth Amendment privacy interests.
This Note proposes that courts should extend the logic of Riley to the
border by treating searches of travelers’ electronic devices as distinctly more
harmful to Fourth Amendment interests than searches of other types of
property. This Note argues that border searches of electronic devices should
be justified by a standard of at least reasonable suspicion in order to balance
the necessity of border searches with the adverse impact on Fourth
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Amendment privacy concerns caused by extensive searches of travelers’
digital devices.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2017, two U.S. citizens traveling from Canada to Vermont were
detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers while
crossing the border.1 Customs officers gave no reason for the search: a CBP
supervisor told the travelers that they were being detained and that their
smartphones were being searched because he “simply felt like ordering a
secondary inspection.”2 One of the travelers, who wears a headscarf in
accordance with her religious beliefs, refused to give a male CBP officer
permission to search her phone because it contained photographs of her
1. Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5 (D. Mass. May
9, 2018).
2. Id.
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without her headscarf.3 After approximately six hours of detention, the
travelers departed without their phones, which were returned damaged fifteen
days later.4
A 2009 CBP policy in force at the time of these border searches permitted
“confiscation of electronic devices for on- or off-site search without any level
of suspicion.”5 Recognizing this, law enforcement officials have ordered
border searches of travelers’ devices to gather evidence of crimes unrelated
to the import or export of contraband.6 This policy has forced certain
travelers—including lawyers who need to protect attorney-client privilege,
business people with proprietary information, researchers who promise their
subjects anonymity, and photojournalists who may pledge to blur a face to
conceal an identity—to take precautions to minimize data on electronic
devices they take across the U.S. border.7
The border search doctrine, which dates back to this country’s founding
era, exempts government searches of travelers’ belongings from the
traditional Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless searches and
seizures.8 The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly justified this exemption
by reasoning that “the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent authority
to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity.”9
The long-standing border search doctrine permits extensive, intrusive,
suspicionless searches of property at the border—but places limits on
invasive searches of a traveler’s body.10
The government routinely conducts suspicionless searches of travelers’
electronic devices at the border in accordance with the traditional border
search doctrine.11 Federal courts initially rejected Fourth Amendment
3. See id.
4. The traveler contended that CBP’s search and seizure of one phone “damaged its
functionality.” See id.
5. See id. (noting that “the 2009 CBP Policy did not distinguish between a basic and
advanced search and no level of suspicion was required for either”).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Jae Shik Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 46 (D.D.C. 2015)
(describing a law enforcement officer’s border search of a traveler’s laptop as “nothing more
than a fishing expedition to discover what [the traveler] might have been up to”).
7. See David K. Shipler, Can You Frisk a Hard Drive?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/20/weekinreview/20laptop.html [https://perma.cc/3X45U3NE].
8. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617–18 (1977).
9. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004); see also United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985); Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616–17.
10. Compare Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154–56 (upholding the suspicionless
disassembly of a car’s fuel tank), with Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 (holding that
the extended, nonroutine detention of a traveler at the border was justified by customs officers’
reasonable suspicion that the traveler was smuggling drugs in a body cavity).
11. See, e.g., Mana Azarmi & Greg Nojeim, Border Searches of Electronic Devices: Oh,
the Places Your Data Will Go, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://cdt.org/blog/border-searches-of-electronic-devices-oh-the-places-your-data-will-go/
[https://perma.cc/XW6E-CWBZ]; Sophia Cope & Aaron Mackey, New CBP Border Device
Search Policy Still Permits Unconstitutional Searches, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan.
8, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/01/new-cbp-border-device-search-policy-stillpermits-unconstitutional-searches [https://perma.cc/6WL4-UZFU].
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challenges to border searches of electronic devices on the grounds that cell
phones and computers are no different than other forms of property.12 More
recent cases suggest the emergence of a view that searches of electronic
devices implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests more than searches
of other types of personal property.13 In 2013, the Ninth Circuit held in
United States v. Cotterman14 that the Fourth Amendment requires border
agents to show reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before undertaking
a “forensic” search of a computer.15 In Riley v. California,16 a nonborder
decision issued the following year, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
view that searches of cell phones should be treated the same as searches of
other types of property. In Riley, a unanimous Court declared that searches
of “[m]odern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far
beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a
purse.”17 Following Cotterman and Riley, a split emerged in the circuit
courts over whether to extend Riley’s privacy-focused treatment of electronic
devices to the border.18
Millions of people cross the United States border carrying cell phones and
electronic devices every day.19 On a typical day in the 2017 fiscal year,
American border officials processed 1,088,300 incoming passengers and
pedestrians, including 283,664 private vehicles.20 The vast majority of
Americans—95 percent—own a cell phone, with 77 percent of Americans
now owning a smartphone.21 Nearly all of those travelers carried a
12. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment does not protect electronic devices—including computers and cell
phones—from warrantless and suspicionless searches in the border context); United States v.
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 504–05 (4th Cir. 2005) (same); see also United States v. LinarezDelgado, 259 F. App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that there is no reasonable suspicion
required for a routine border search of “[d]ata storage media and electronic equipment, such
as films, computer devices, and videotapes”).
13. See Thomas Mann Miller, Comment, Digital Border Searches After Riley v.
California, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1943, 1979–82 (2015).
14. 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
15. Id. at 956–57.
16. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
17. Id. at 2488–89.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See Patrick G. Lee, Can Customs and Border Officials Search Your Phone? These
Are Your Rights, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 13, 2017, 12:55 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/
can-customs-border-protection-search-phone-legal-rights [https://perma.cc/85LK-2GLN].
20. On a Typical Day in Fiscal Year 2017, CBP . . ., U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/typical-day-fy2017
[https://perma.cc/82X8-RHGT]. In all, approximately 226.9 million air passengers traveled
between the United States and the rest of the world in 2017. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
U.S. INTERNATIONAL AIR PASSENGER AND FREIGHT STATISTICS 3 (2017),
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/mission/office-policy/aviationpolicy/311371/us-international-air-passenger-and-freight-statistics-december-2017_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SLS9-L3BA] (noting a 5 percent increase in passengers from the previous
year).
21. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/7J7M-N4P3] (noting that the smartphone figure is up from just
35 percent since 2011). In fact, approximately 90 percent of U.S. households contain at least
one internet-connected electronic device (smartphone, desktop or laptop computer, tablet, or
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smartphone or laptop,22 which means that nearly all of those devices were
subject to warrantless, suspicionless searches by U.S. border officials.23
Customs officers stationed at the U.S. border and at airports searched an
estimated 30,200 cell phones, computers, and other electronic devices of
people entering and leaving the United States in 2017—an almost 60 percent
increase from 2016.24 In fact, U.S. border officials searched more phones in
a single month of 2017 than in all of 2015.25 CBP officials claim that border
searches of electronic devices “are critical to the detection of evidence
relating to terrorism and other national security matters, human and bulk cash
smuggling, contraband, and child pornography.”26 Privacy activists and
those who have been detained at the border say the examination of phones,
computers, and hard drives is invasive and violates Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable searches.27
This Note addresses the application of the border search exception to
electronic devices.28 The Supreme Court has not yet decided how Fourth
Amendment protections apply to this situation.29 Based on the traditional
border search exception to Fourth Amendment protection, border officials
may conduct “routine” searches of persons and personal property without
suspicion of criminal activity or a warrant.30 The Court has indicated that
some “nonroutine” searches—including those destructive to personal

streaming media device), with the median American household containing five of them. See
A Third of Americans Live in a Household with Three or More Smartphones, PEW RES. CTR.
(May 25, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/25/a-third-of-americans-livein-a-household-with-three-or-more-smartphones/ [https://perma.cc/7NR6-CJZV].
22. PORTABLE ELEC. DEVICES AVIATION RULEMAKING COMM., RECOMMENDATIONS ON
EXPANDING THE USE OF PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES DURING FLIGHT H-8 (2013),
https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/ped/media/PED_ARC_FINAL_REPORT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q2E4-4A7B] (noting that “[n]early all (94%) U.S. adult airline passengers
have brought at least one [portable electronic device] with them onto an aircraft while traveling
in the past 12 months”).
23. See generally, e.g., Border Security: America’s Front Line (Force Four Entertainment
2018) (depicting numerous warrantless border searches of cell phones by U.S. customs
officers over the course of a twenty-eight-episode reality television series).
24. Ron Nixon, Cellphone and Computer Searches at U.S. Border Rise Under Trump,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/us/politics/trump-bordersearch-cellphone-computer.html [https://perma.cc/JGH8-NP5Q].
25. See Tim Cushing, Phone Searches Now Default Mode at the Border; More Searches
Last Month Than in All of 2015, TECHDIRT (Mar. 14, 2017, 10:49 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20170314/08063936914/phone-searches-now-defaultmode-border-more-searches-last-month-than-all-2015.shtml [http://perma.cc/3ysc-wcav].
26. Olivia Solon, US Border Agents Are Doing ‘Digital Strip Searches’. Here’s How to
Protect Yourself, GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/
mar/31/us-border-phone-computer-searches-how-to-protect [https://perma.cc/Z69N-KVCZ].
Electronic devices “can also reveal information about financial and commercial crimes, such
as those relating to copyright, trademark and export control violations.” Id.
27. See, e.g., Azarmi & Nojeim, supra note 11; Nixon, supra note 24.
28. This Note will not distinguish between the Fourth Amendment rights or privacy
expectations of U.S. citizens and noncitizens at the border.
29. See infra Part I.B.; see also Miller, supra note 13, at 1944–45.
30. See Miller, supra note 13, at 1944–45.

2260

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

property or highly intrusive to personal dignity—may require some level of
suspicion.31
This Note analyzes the two alternative approaches taken by federal circuit
courts to the border search exception as it applies to electronic devices.32 The
traditional approach treats border searches of cell phones or other electronic
devices as analytically equivalent to searches of physical items that require
no individualized suspicion to search.33 Other courts emphasize the special
privacy concerns presented by suspicionless searches of electronic devices
and call for a narrower application of the border search exception to digital
devices.34 The circuit split has adverse consequences for customs officials
working at airports and border crossings across the United States: whether a
border guard needs reasonable suspicion to search your electronic devices
depends on where you enter the country.35
Part I of this Note provides background information on the nature of the
Fourth Amendment’s traditional warrant requirement and its border search
exception. This breakdown considers recent Supreme Court rulings
regarding Fourth Amendment rights at the border.
Part II analyzes the current conflict among the U.S. courts of appeals in
how the border search exception should be applied to travelers’ nowubiquitous electronic devices. The Note divides the courts into two groups:
(1) those holding that the heightened privacy implications of a nonroutine
border search of a traveler’s electronic device call for some form of
individualized suspicion, and (2) those advocating the traditional position
that searches of property at the border may be conducted without any
individualized suspicion.
Part III argues that Riley endorses a burgeoning understanding of
electronic devices as a special category of property subject to heightened
privacy concerns. This Note argues that all border searches of electronic
devices are therefore nonroutine and require some form of individualized
suspicion. This Note concludes by offering several legal and public policy
justifications for extending Riley’s logic to the border and (partially) endorses
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ understanding of the border search doctrine as
it applies to electronic devices.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND PRIVACY AT THE BORDER
Though many issues involved in searches of electronic devices are new,
the border search exception itself dates back to the country’s founding era.
This Part reviews the case law underpinning the traditional border search
31. See infra Part I.B.1.
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Part II.B; see also infra Part I.B.
34. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v.
Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); infra Part II.A.
35. See Ayako Hobbs, Tara Swaminatha & Thomas Zeno, Circuits Split About Border
Search of Electronic Devices, ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (June 19, 2018),
https://www.anticorruptionblog.com/data-protection-privacy/circuits-split-about-bordersearch-of-electronic-devices/ [https://perma.cc/ZQT9-DHTQ].
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doctrine and the application of border search principles to electronic devices.
It also details recent developments in electronic privacy jurisprudence that
may impact the search of digital devices at the border.
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”36
The Fourth Amendment applies when an individual
demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy and society recognizes that
expectation as reasonable.37
In order for a search or seizure to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, it must
be “reasonable.”38 “A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable” in the
absence of “individualized suspicion of wrongdoing”; the police cannot
simply search an individual’s house or car at random.39 A reasonable search
“generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant” supported by probable
cause.40 According to ordinary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a search
or seizure accomplished without a judicial warrant issued upon a showing of
probable cause is per se unreasonable.41
In the absence of a warrant, a search or seizure is reasonable only if it falls
within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.42 The Supreme Court
imposes a presumptive warrant requirement for searches and seizures43 and
generally requires probable cause for a warrantless search or seizure to be
“reasonable.”44 There are a number of important exceptions to this general
warrant requirement, and in practice many searches are conducted without a
warrant or probable cause.45
Courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to permit certain types of
searches and seizures as exceptions to the warrant requirement.46 Advances
36. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (“Our Fourth Amendment
analysis embraces two questions. First, we ask whether the individual, by his conduct, has
exhibited an actual expectation of privacy . . . . Second, we inquire whether the individual’s
expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’” (quoting
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979))).
38. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,
403 (2006))).
39. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
40. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653
(1995)).
41. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983).
42. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482; Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).
43. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948) (noting that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for searches
and seizures unless a preexisting exception applies).
44. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 143 (2013); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357;
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14–15.
45. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451–52 (2015); Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19–20 (1984).
46. See, e.g. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494; Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 & n.19.
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in technology brought challenges to the warrant requirement to the Supreme
Court.47 Even in these exceptional cases, the Supreme Court generally
requires the government to demonstrate probable cause48 or a lower standard
called “reasonable suspicion”49 in order for the search to be considered
reasonable.50 Warrantless searches are typically justified when the process
of obtaining a judicial warrant would be impracticable or counterproductive
to the government’s interests.51
B. The Border Search Exception
Border searches have historically been viewed as one exception to the
individualized-suspicion requirement.52 Routine border searches are
permitted absent any individualized suspicion because “the Government’s
interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith
at the international border.”53 However, more intrusive, nonroutine searches
may require a showing of a lower level of individualized suspicion:
reasonable suspicion.54
1. History of the Border Search Exception
Border searches are among the earliest recognized exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment requirements of a warrant and probable cause.55 The same
Congress that passed the Fourth Amendment passed the Act of July 31, 1789,
which allowed border officials to conduct warrantless searches of vessels
entering the United States.56
47. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (analyzing the Fourth Amendment implications of
electronic eavesdropping); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (discussing the
Fourth Amendment implications of an automobile search).
48. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34–35 (1963) (stating that a warrantless seizure
must be supported by probable cause to believe that the person has committed the violation in
question).
49. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 123 (2000); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968).
50. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155–56 (noting that probable cause is a “reasonableness”
standard for warrantless searches and seizures); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498
(1983) (“[C]ertain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is articulable
suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.”); Hill v. California, 401
U.S. 797, 804 (1971) (“[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.”).
51. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618–20 (1989); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
52. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–18 (1977).
53. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
54. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
55. The power of customs officials to conduct searches at the border has an “impressive
historical pedigree.” United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 585 (1983); see also
Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616–18; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150 (1925); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623–24 (1886).
56. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 150 (“As [the Act of July 31, 1789] was passed by the same
Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear
that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as
‘unreasonable,’ and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment.”).
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This Act established a series of customs offices and gave officials “full
power and authority” to enter and search “any ship or vessel, in which they
shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty
shall be concealed” and to secure any such items that were found.57 The Act
specifically differentiated between searches conducted on ships at ports of
entry—where “full power and authority” were directly granted without need
for judicial oversight—and those of “any particular dwelling-house, store,
building, or other place” for which the agents needed to obtain a warrant.58
Therefore, searches at the border could be conducted at the discretion of the
customs agents, whereas searches by customs agents for smuggled goods at
nonborder locations were subject to an external warrant requirement. This
waiver of the warrant requirement at the border is the core of the border
search exception, and it has been in place since 1789.59 The Supreme Court
has repeatedly pointed to the long history of the border search exception as
support for its constitutionality.60
Traditionally, searches conducted at the border or its “functional
equivalent”61 do not require any suspicion on the theory that the government
has a strong sovereign interest in regulating what enters and exits the
country.62 The Supreme Court has repeatedly described the federal
government’s right and obligation to protect the nation’s borders in absolutist
terms.63 The Fourth Amendment does not require warrants for routine stops
and searches at borders because the sovereign state and its public officials64
57. Act of July 31, 1789, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43, repealed by Act of Aug. 4, 1790, § 74, 1
Stat. 145, 178.
58. Id.
59. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537–38.
60. See, e.g., Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616–17 (noting that the First Congress also proposed
the Bill of Rights, and that the First Congress therefore can be presumed not to have thought
the Act inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623 (observing that “the
seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws . . . has been authorized by English
statutes for at least two centuries past”).
61. International airports are included as “functional equivalents” of the border. See, e.g.,
United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the border search
exception applies at international airports because it is the “functional equivalent of a border”);
United States v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the border search
exception applies at the customs gate at Chicago O’Hare International Airport); United States
v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the border search exception applied at
an airport in Puerto Rico because the traveler was departing on an international flight). But
see, e.g., United States v. Mayer, 818 F.2d 725, 727–28 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
functional-equivalent-of-border exception did not apply to a domestic airport where there was
uncertainty as to whether the plane had come from Mexico).
62. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004).
63. See id. at 153 (“It is axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent
authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity.”); Ramsey,
431 U.S. at 616 (“[S]earches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the
sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this
country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.”).
64. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (2012) (authorizing warrantless searches at the border by
immigration officials); 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (2012) (permitting warrantless Coast Guard
inspections, searches, and seizures on the high seas and in U.S. waters); 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a)
(2012) (authorizing customs officers to search any vessel or vehicle anywhere inside the
United States, within customs waters, or in any other authorized place without a warrant).
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have the right to protect the United States by stopping and examining persons
and property entering65 or leaving66 the country. The Supreme Court has
largely embraced this principle of sovereign prerogative in its Fourth
Amendment border search doctrine.67
Modern border search cases have typically concerned the smuggling of
controlled substances and involved the government applying the border
search exception to new situations and emerging technologies.68 In the
Prohibition-era case Carroll v. United States,69 the Court used the border
search doctrine as a point of comparison in devising a new exception to the
warrant requirement for a nonborder search of automobiles within the
country.70 The Carroll Court said that “[t]ravellers may be so stopped
[without cause] in crossing an international boundary because of national self
protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself
as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully
brought in.”71 Domestic automobile searches, in contrast, were held to
require probable cause (though not a warrant) because the state does not have
the same set of strong national defense interests in the nation’s interior that
it does at the border, where a search is presumptively reasonable even without
probable cause.72
The Court echoed Carroll over fifty years later in United States v.
Ramsey73 and stated that the sovereign has a strong interest in controlling
“who and what may enter the country.”74 In Ramsey, the Court upheld a
statute giving postal inspectors the power to open and inspect packages
without a warrant if they had “reasonable cause to suspect” that the package
contained contraband.75 In holding the statute constitutional, the Court stated
that the proposition “[t]hat searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining
65. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (holding that
the government has “plenary authority” to conduct routine warrantless searches “to prevent
the introduction of contraband”); see also Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (holding that the
government may search a vehicle crossing the border because of its “interest in preventing the
entry of unwanted persons and effects”).
66. See, e.g., Beras, 183 F.3d at 26 (noting widespread agreement among the circuit courts
that the border search exception applies to outgoing as well as incoming travelers).
67. See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472–73 (1979) (“The authority of the
United States to search the baggage of arriving international travelers is based on its inherent
sovereign authority to protect its territorial integrity.”); see also Benjamin J. Rankin, Note,
Restoring Privacy at the Border: Extending the Reasonable Suspicion Standard for Laptop
Border Searches, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 301, 306–07 (2011).
68. See Sid Nadkarni, “Let’s Have a Look, Shall We?” A Model for Evaluating
Suspicionless Border Searches of Portable Electronic Devices, 61 UCLA L. REV. 146, 184–
86 (2013).
69. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
70. See id. at 153–54. The case concerned the smuggling of alcohol during Prohibition.
See id. at 159–60.
71. Id. at 154.
72. See id.
73. 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
74. See id. at 620.
75. Id. at 607–08. The package in question turned out to contain heroin. Id. at 610–11.
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persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by
virtue of the fact that they occur at the border” required “no extended
demonstration.”76
Under Ramsey, officials may conduct routine border searches without a
warrant or probable cause when those searches are tethered to the
government’s interest in examining persons and property seeking entrance to
the United States.77 The Court, however, expressly reserved judgment on the
question of “whether, and under what circumstances, a border search might
be deemed ‘unreasonable’ because of the particularly offensive manner in
which it is carried out.”78
2. Routine and Nonroutine Privacy Intrusions at the Border
Two aspects of the Court’s modern border search decisions obscure the
clarity of its underlying principles: (1) the reasonableness balancing test, and
(2) the distinction between “routine” and “nonroutine” border searches.79 As
weighing individual privacy interests against government intrusions became
a more common element of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,80
that balancing test began to crop up in the Court’s border search opinions.81
The Court also stated that an individualized level of suspicion may be
necessary for some intrusions beyond the scope of “routine” customs
searches and inspections.82
There are two broad categories of border searches: “routine” and
“nonroutine.”83 A “routine” search of a person and his or her effects crossing
an international border into the United States is not subject to any
requirement of reasonable suspicion that an item contains contraband or
evidence of criminal activity.84 Border officials can conduct “routine”
searches without any individualized suspicion.85
On the other hand, a “nonroutine” search involving a high degree of
personal intrusion—such as a strip search—requires “reasonable suspicion,”
which calls for some particularized and objective basis for suspecting

76. Id. at 616.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 618 n.13.
79. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION
§ 10.2.1, at 592–93 (3d ed. 2017).
80. Id. § 11.3.4, at 706 (describing the rise of the Supreme Court’s balancing test for
privacy interests in the 1960s).
81. Still, the Court noted that “the Fourth Amendment’s balance of reasonableness is
qualitatively different at the international border.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985); see also Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616–19.
82. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539–41 (upholding a nonroutine, sixteen-hour
detention of an individual who was reasonably suspected of smuggling drugs into the country
in her alimentary canal); cf. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n.3 (2004)
(observing that “delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected”).
83. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541.
84. Id. at 537–38.
85. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (quoting Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538).

2266

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

wrongdoing.86 A search crosses the threshold and becomes nonroutine if it
is either particularly offensive (such as an intrusive search of the body) or
physically destructive.87 Courts have recognized that nonroutine border
searches require a greater level of suspicion than routine searches.88
Although the government possesses broad powers to conduct suspicionless
border searches and seizures, the Supreme Court and lower courts have
generally required at least reasonable suspicion for nonroutine border
searches.89 These invasive searches, which significantly intrude on an
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests, require a minimal showing of
reasonable suspicion.90 The Supreme Court views the privacy interests
implicated by a seizure of an international traveler at the border differently
than those involved in the seizure of a person walking the streets of the
interior United States.91 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly
stated what distinguishes a routine from a nonroutine border search, circuit
courts have typically examined several factors in making such a
determination.92
Circuit courts generally agree that the degree of intrusiveness is
determinative of the suspicion required to necessitate the search.93 Lengthy
86. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541–42; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968) (“And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.”).
87. See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1007–08 (9th Cir. 2008).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Outlaw, 319 F.3d 701, 703 (5th Cir. 2003) (requiring
reasonable individualized suspicion for detentions at immigration checkpoints); United States
v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 267–68 (2d Cir. 1989) (requiring reasonable suspicion for
nonroutine border searches).
89. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540–41; Nadkarni, supra note 68, at 161–63.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(requiring reasonable suspicion for a forensic search of a laptop seized at the border).
91. Compare Terry, 392 U.S. at 23 (“The crux of this case . . . [is] whether there was
justification for [the officer’s] invasion of Terry’s personal security by searching him for
weapons in the course of that investigation.”), with Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538
(“Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.”), and United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels
of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973) (“Import restrictions and searches of persons
or packages at the national borders rest on different considerations and different rules of
constitutional law from domestic regulations.”).
92. See United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1988). The First Circuit
considers six factors when determining whether a search is “nonroutine”:
(i) whether the search results in the exposure of intimate body parts or requires the
suspect to disrobe;
(ii) whether physical contact between Customs officials and the suspect occurs
during the search;
(iii) whether force is used to effect the search;
(iv) whether the type of search exposes the suspect to pain or danger;
(v) the overall manner in which the search is conducted; and
(vi) whether the suspect’s reasonable expectations of privacy, if any, are abrogated
by the search[.]
Id. (footnotes omitted).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the
invasion of the privacy and dignity of the individual” is the “key variable” in determining
whether a border search was routine or nonroutine (quoting United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d
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detentions and highly intrusive searches of the person—such as strip
searches,94 extended customs detentions,95 or body-cavity searches96—
require some level of particularized suspicion due to their impact on the
“dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched.”97 The Supreme
Court, however, has never squarely addressed the issue of what level of
suspicion these searches require.98
The Supreme Court has thus far explicitly limited the routine-nonroutine
distinction to those cases involving searches of persons rather than searches
of property.99 In United States v. Flores-Montano,100 the Court declared that
“[c]omplex balancing tests to determine what is a ‘routine’ search of a
vehicle, as opposed to a more ‘intrusive’ search of a person, have no place in
border searches of vehicles.”101 Most searches of travelers’ luggage,
personal effects, and vehicles are found to be sufficiently nonintrusive with
regard to individual privacy and dignity interests to qualify as routine border
searches that do not require individualized suspicion.102 When the courts
first applied the Fourth Amendment to border searches of computers, they
1163, 1167 (5th Cir. 1981))); Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 203–04 (3d Cir. 2002)
(holding that the intrusiveness of a border search determines whether that border search was
routine or nonroutine); United States v. Tsai, 282 F.3d 690, 694 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that
“the ‘degree of intrusiveness’” is “the ‘critical factor’” in determining whether a border search
is routine (quoting United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 713 (9th Cir. 2002)));
United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that “[r]outine border
inspections” do not “embarrass or offend the average traveler”).
94. See, e.g., Bradley, 299 F.3d at 203–04 (contrasting a routine pat-down with a
nonroutine strip search); United States v. Reyes, 821 F.2d 168, 170–71 (2d Cir. 1987)
(requiring reasonable suspicion that the defendant was concealing contraband to justify a strip
search at the border).
95. See United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 836–37 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that
reasonable suspicion justified extended detention for travelers suspected of smuggling drugs).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Handy, 788 F.2d 1419, 1420–21 (9th Cir. 1986) (requiring
a “clear indication” that the defendant carried drugs internally to justify a body-cavity search
at the border); United States v. Pino, 729 F.2d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 1984) (requiring
articulable suspicion that a defendant is carrying drugs in his rectal area to justify a cavity
search).
97. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
98. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 n.4 (1985) (“[W]e
suggest no view on what level of suspicion, if any, is required for nonroutine border searches
such as strip, body-cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches.”).
99. See, e.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (“[T]he reasons that might support a
requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person—
dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched—simply do not carry over to
vehicles.”).
100. 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
101. Id. at 152.
102. See id. at 154–55 (holding that a search of a vehicle that included disassembly and
reassembly of a fuel tank qualified as routine because it did not damage the vehicle and was
completed in one hour); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (holding
that the thorough search of a car at the border was not sufficiently intrusive to qualify as
nonroutine border search); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2006)
(holding that the search of luggage at an airport was not sufficiently intrusive to qualify as a
nonroutine search); United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a patdown search of a departing international traveler’s legs was not sufficiently intrusive to qualify
as a nonroutine border search).
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held that searches of computers were ordinary searches that did not require
suspicion.103 Searches that physically damage or destroy the property will
also be subject to a reasonable suspicion requirement,104 but the Supreme
Court has never held that reasonable suspicion is required for a
nondestructive property search at the border.105
In the wake of Flores-Montano, there is an open question whether the
“dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched” ever require
limitations on searches of property at the border.106 The Court’s holding that
these interests were insufficiently implicated by a vehicle search could be
taken as either a conclusion about searches of a specific type of property or
as a general statement about all property searches.107 Unsurprisingly, lower
court judges trying to apply Flores-Montano to searches of electronic devices
have differed on this point.108
3. The Scope of Privacy Intrusions in the Digital Context
Electronic devices pose novel challenges for the border search doctrine.109
With technological advancements, the privacy implications of a rule at one
time may be vastly different than the implications of that same rule at a later
point in time.110 If laptops are viewed as simply pieces of property traveling
across the border, then the traditional border search doctrine provides little
support for requiring any elevated degree of suspicion for their search.111
Critics of the traditional border search doctrine argue that searches of
laptops or smartphones are analogous to intrusive searches of the body due
to the sensitive personal information potentially stored on those devices.112
103. See, e.g., United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 n.11 (9th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506–08 (4th Cir. 2005).
104. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 n.2 (distinguishing permissible suspicionless
disassembly and reassembly of a fuel tank from “potentially destructive drilling”); see, e.g.,
United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367–68 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that drilling into a metal
trailer was a nonroutine border search requiring reasonable suspicion); United States v.
Robles, 45 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that drilling into a metal cylinder was a
nonroutine search that was justified by the government’s reasonable suspicion).
105. See Nadkarni, supra note 68, at 161–62.
106. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152.
107. See id.; infra Part II.
108. See infra Part II.
109. See Orin S. Kerr, Every Computer Border Search Requires Case-by-Case
Reasonableness, DC Court Holds, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 12, 2015, 2:01 AM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2015/05/12/every-computer-border-search-r [https://perma.cc/KF
4D-3PXQ].
110. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, in SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (THE FOURTH AMENDMENT): ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 230, 231 (Cynthia Lee ed.,
2011) (describing the declining social importance of public telephones between the 1960s and
2010s).
111. See, e.g., Erick Lucadamo, Note, Reading Your Mind at the Border: Searching
Memorialized Thoughts and Memories on Your Laptop and United States v. Arnold, 54 VILL.
L. REV. 541, 570–71 (2009).
112. See, e.g., Kindal Wright, Comment, Border Searches in a Modern World: Are
Laptops Merely Closed Containers, or Are They Something More?, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 701,
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“While computers are compact at a physical level, every computer is akin to
a vast warehouse of information.”113 A brief search of a smartphone—much
less a forensic analysis of the device—reveals intimate data such as a user’s
personal photos, internet search histories, and email correspondence going
back for many years. If the device is connected to the cloud, then the
investigator has virtually unlimited access to a person’s digital existence.114
Thus, critics reason that searches of laptops, which may expose a person’s
innermost thoughts, are as intrusive as strip searches or body-cavity searches
that expose the body—searches that courts subject to a reasonable suspicion
standard.115
This position sits uneasily with longstanding precedent regarding
suspicionless searches of nondigital items.116 Courts have long ruled that
border searches of intimate property such as private diaries or personal
papers, which almost by definition contain similarly expressive, private
materials, require no reasonable suspicion.117 Some critics therefore charge
that computers are no different than any other kind of property carried across
the border.118 A district court outright dismissed the concerns expressed in
Riley about searching digital technology: “Laptops and cell phones are
indeed becoming quantitatively, and perhaps qualitatively, different from
other items, but that simply means there is more room to hide digital
contraband, and therefore more storage space that must be searched.”119
Forensic searches of electronic devices can represent distinctly intrusive
searches because users are often unaware of what they are carrying on any

702 (2009) (concluding that the “proper analogy” for a laptop computer search “should not be
that of a closed container, but that of a physical, bodily intrusion due to the large amount of
personal memories and personal documents that can be stored on computers”).
113. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 542
(2005).
114. A 2018 CBP report noted this concern: “[One] privacy risk concerns CBP’s potential
over-collection of information from individuals due to the volume of information that is either
stored on, or accessible by, today’s electronic devices.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
DHS/CBP/PIA-008(A), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR CBP BORDER SEARCHES
OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 2 (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
PIA-CBP%20-%20Border-Searches-of-Electronic-Devices%20-January-2018%20-%20
Compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHD4-RCJT].
115. See, e.g., Nadkarni, supra note 68, at 168–69; Rankin, supra note 67, at 331.
116. See supra Part I.B.1.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 563 (D. Md. 2014)
(“Although it surely is a discomforting concept, there is no principle beyond the shortness of
life and the acknowledgement that there is only so much time available to conduct any
particular border search that prevents a CBP officer from ‘reading a diary line by line looking
for mention of criminal activity.’” (quoting United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 962–
63 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc))).
118. One commentator notes that “[a] laptop is simply a new medium through which old
ideas, information, habits, and practices are used and recorded.” Lucadamo, supra note 111,
at 571.
119. United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 2016 WL 894452, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9,
2016).
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given device.120 Most people understand how to remove items from their
suitcase before crossing a border, but few know how to permanently remove
unwanted files from a digital device.121 GPS technology in a vehicle, for
example, may store much the same information as a traveler’s smartphone
without the traveler even realizing it.122 Electronic devices are capable of
storing “a tremendous amount of information that most users do not know
about and cannot control.”123 Forensic search software, for example, permits
analysts to comb through electronic devices for files “deleted” by the user.124
This is possible because marking a file “deleted” usually only marks that file
cluster as available to be overwritten by other files.125 Thus, “deleted” files
are not instantly removed from the device but may remain on the device
undisturbed for an analyst to recover them.126
Similarly, the ubiquity of cloud computing potentially places information
stored on remote servers in the hands of U.S. border agents.127 Until 2018,
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents claimed full authority to
search the contents of cloud devices at the border.128 Border searches gaining
access to data in the cloud effectively raid a “virtual safe deposit box,” which
does not itself cross the border.129
The length of time required to undertake a thorough forensic evaluation of
an electronic device provides another potential reason to treat searches of
these devices as distinct from searches of other forms of property.130
Electronic devices may be held indefinitely by the government and searched
over extended periods of time.131 Forensic searches of electronic devices are
120. See generally SOPHIA COPE ET AL., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., DIGITAL PRIVACY AT THE
U.S. BORDER: PROTECTING THE DATA ON YOUR DEVICES (2017), https://www.eff.org/wp/
digital-privacy-us-border-2017 [https://perma.cc/C6PN-U9Q8].
121. See id.; see also Matthew B. Kugler, Comment, The Perceived Intrusiveness of
Searching Electronic Devices at the Border: An Empirical Study, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165,
1184–85 (2014).
122. See George I. Seffers, DHS Navigates the World of Vehicular Digital Forensics,
AFCEA: SIGNAL (May 25, 2016), https://www.afcea.org/content/Article-dhs-navigatesworld-vehicular-digital-forensics [https://perma.cc/TP27-WKTE] (describing DHS searches
of in-vehicle systems that “store a vast amount of data, such as recent destinations, favorite
locations, call logs, contact lists, text messages, emails, pictures, videos, social media feeds
and navigation history”).
123. Kerr, supra note 113, at 542.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Esha Bhandari, The Government’s New Policy on Device Searches at the Border:
What You Need to Know, ACLU (Jan. 9, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacytechnology/privacy-borders-and-checkpoints/governments-new-policy-device-searches
[https://perma.cc/RNJ7-B83Q].
128. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 114, at 8 (announcing the updated
policy that DHS officers may no longer “intentionally use the device to access information
that is solely stored remotely”).
129. Kugler, supra note 121, at 1185.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 560–61 (D. Md. 2014)
(noting the privacy concerns implicated by the “potentially limitless duration and scope of a
forensic search”).
131. See Rankin, supra note 67, at 346–47.
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typically performed by trained analysts at a government facility away from
the border.132 These searches can last for a period of weeks or even months,
during which the travelers have no access to their devices.133
C. Searches of Electronic Devices and Data: Riley and Carpenter
The case with the greatest impact on the debate surrounding suspicionless
border searches of electronic devices is Riley v. California,134 wherein the
Supreme Court weighed in on warrantless searches of portable electronic
devices incident to arrest.135 Prior to Riley, the Supreme Court had been
reluctant to decide Fourth Amendment issues raised by changing privacy
expectations with respect to electronic devices.136 As Chief Justice Roberts
noted, “A smart phone of the sort taken from Riley was unheard of ten years
ago; a significant majority of American adults now own such phones.”137 In
Riley, the Supreme Court held that a warrant is required to search a cell phone
incident to arrest because of the quantity and quality of information stored on
the device.138 The Riley Court concluded that the traditional search-incidentto-arrest exception did not justify dispensing with the warrant requirement
for searches of digital devices under the usual concerns for officers’ safety or
a fear of destruction of evidence.139
Riley “marks a turning point in the evolution” of the Court’s jurisprudence
regarding the Fourth Amendment’s application to electronic devices.140
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, commented
extensively on individual privacy interests at stake when the government
searches portable electronic devices.141 The Court took care to highlight the
“immense storage capacity” of modern cell phones in distinguishing these
electronic devices from other forms of personal storage, such as suitcases or
trunks.142 The storage capacity of modern phones—the ability to “store
millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos”143—
means that “a cell phone search would typically expose to the government
132. See id. at 320.
133. See Kerr, supra note 113, at 537–38; see also, e.g., Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *21 (D. Mass. May 9, 2018) (noting the confiscation of a
traveler’s electronic devices for ten months in one instance and fifty-six days in another).
134. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
135. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 13, at 1945.
136. The Court noted that “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.”
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010).
137. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
138. See id. at 2485.
139. Id. at 2485–88; see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969)
(establishing the search-incident-to-arrest exception’s principal concerns with officer safety
and destruction of evidence).
140. CLANCY, supra note 79, § 1.5.2, at 44.
141. See id.
142. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
143. Id. at 2478. “Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have received
for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or article they have
read—nor would they have any reason to attempt to do so.” Id. at 2489.
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far more than the most exhaustive search of a house.”144 In distinguishing
the Court’s new approach to cell phone data searches, Chief Justice Roberts
noted “an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not
physical records.”145 Before the digital age, “people did not typically carry
a cache of sensitive personal information with them as they went about their
day.”146
The Riley Court also emphasized that data stored on electronic devices is
“qualitatively different” than the data found in physical records.147 The
browsing history of an internet-enabled phone “could reveal an individual’s
private interests or concerns” and, through now-ubiquitous “[h]istoric
location information, . . . can reconstruct someone’s specific movements
down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular
building.”148 Riley’s discussion of the privacy implications of cell phone
searches echoes the concerns raised by Justice Sotomayor’s concurring
opinion in United States v. Jones,149 which suggested a revision of another
traditional search warrant exception doctrine—the third-party doctrine—in
light of advancing cell phone technology.150
The Riley Court concluded that, given all that modern cell phones “contain
and all that they may reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of
life.’”151 The unanimous Court’s “answer to the question of what police must
do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly
simple—get a warrant.”152
In June 2018, in United States v. Carpenter,153 the Supreme Court repeated
the privacy concerns expressed in Riley regarding cell phone data
searches.154 In Carpenter, the Court held that the government’s warrantless
acquisition of a suspect’s cell phone location data in a routine criminal
investigation qualified as a search under the Fourth Amendment.155 Chief
144. Id. at 2491 (explaining that a cell phone “also contains a broad array of private
information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is [recovered as part of the
search of a home]”).
145. Id. at 2490.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
150. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise,
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”); see also Elkin
Girgenti, Computer Crimes, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 911, 941 (2018) (highlighting the influence
of Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones on the majority’s opinion in Riley).
151. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)).
152. Id. at 2495.
153. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
154. David Kris, Carpenter’s Implications for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, LAWFARE
(June 24, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/carpenters-implications-foreignintelligence-surveillance [https://perma.cc/S77K-T9SE] (“In its reasoning and result,
Carpenter strongly resembles the prior decision in Riley, which required a warrant for the
search incident to an arrest of a cell phone.”).
155. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
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Justice Roberts’s majority opinion cited Riley to illustrate a case in which
changes in technology have necessitated a more nuanced approach.156
Responding to Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice noted that
“[w]hen confronting new concerns wrought by digital technology, this Court
has been careful not to uncritically extend existing precedents.”157
With the Supreme Court’s unclear application of this case law, the lower
courts have reached different conclusions on how to apply this doctrine to
border searches of electronic devices.
II. ELECTRONIC PRIVACY AT THE BORDER: A SPLIT
IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Several circuit courts have heard challenges to evidence obtained during
suspicionless border searches following the most recent major border search
case in the Supreme Court, United States v. Flores-Montano.158 In 2013, the
en banc Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Cotterman, anticipated Riley’s
treatment of heightened privacy concerns triggered by the Fourth
Amendment in searches of electronic devices when it ruled that some border
searches of digital devices require at least reasonable suspicion.159 Five
years later, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Kolsuz,160 explicitly
endorsed the same view: that searches of data on electronic devices implicate
greater privacy concerns than searches of other physical objects.161 These
decisions, in turn, drew strong criticism from the Eleventh Circuit in United
States v. Touset,162 which explicitly rejected Riley’s application at the border
and reaffirmed the traditional rule that border searches of electronic devices
are no different than searches of other physical containers—and thus deserve
no special treatment under the Fourth Amendment.163
A. Extending Riley to the Border: The Ninth Circuit in Cotterman
and the Fourth Circuit in Kolsuz
Between 2013 and 2018, two circuit courts ruled that the Fourth
Amendment required at least reasonable suspicion for some border searches
of electronic devices. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit—whose jurisdiction
encompasses large portions of the U.S. border with Canada and Mexico and

156. Id. at 2214.
157. Id. at 2222 (“A search of the information on a cell phone bears little resemblance to
the type of brief physical search considered [in prior precedents].” (alteration in original)
(quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485)).
158. See Jim Garland & Katharine Goodloe, Federal Appeals Courts Split on Forensic
Searches of Devices Seized at Border, COVINGTON: INSIDE PRIVACY (May 30, 2018),
https://www.insideprivacy.com/international/federal-appeals-courts-split-on-forensicsearches-of-devices-seized-at-border/ [https://perma.cc/SCK4-GGUB]; see also supra notes
100–04 and accompanying text (discussing Flores-Montano).
159. See infra Part II.A.1.
160. 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018).
161. See infra Part II.A.2.
162. 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018).
163. See infra Part II.B.
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some of the country’s busiest international airports164—ruled in United
States v. Cotterman that a forensic search of an electronic device required
some form of reasonable suspicion.165 Following Cotterman, the Fourth
Circuit’s 2018 decision in Kolsuz explicitly applied Riley’s understanding of
the unique privacy concerns raised by searches of electronic devices to the
border.166
1. United States v. Cotterman
In Cotterman, agents seized defendant Howard Cotterman’s laptop at the
border in response to an alert based, in part, on a past conviction for child
molestation.167 An initial search of the laptop at the border did not reveal
incriminating material, but a comprehensive forensic examination of the
laptop carried out 170 miles away uncovered child pornography.168 The
lower court granted Cotterman’s motion to suppress the evidence found on
his laptop,169 and the Ninth Circuit reversed.170 In keeping with its
longstanding position, the Department of Justice refused to argue that there
was reasonable suspicion for the search, which would have preserved the
opportunity for the Supreme Court to review whether reasonable suspicion
was required for such a search had the Court granted certiorari.171
In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit distinguished “a manual review of files on
an electronic device” from a forensic “application of computer software to
analyze a hard drive.”172 Judge M. Margaret McKeown, writing for the
majority, did not explicitly label a forensic search of a laptop “nonroutine,”
but the opinion makes clear that the “substantial personal privacy interests”
impinged by a forensic search moves “beyond the scope of a routine customs
search and inspection.”173
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that a forensic search of a traveler’s laptop
represented “a thorough and detailed search of the most intimate details of
164. See Map of the Ninth Circuit, U.S. CTS. FOR NINTH CIR., http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/
content/view.php?pk_id=0000000135 [https://perma.cc/75AD-UXBU] (last visited Mar. 15,
2019); see also U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 20, tbl.6.
165. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
166. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2018).
167. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 956.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 959.
170. Id. at 957. The court ultimately concluded that while government agents needed
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to undertake the forensic search of Cotterman’s
laptop, they met that requirement. See id.
171. See Orin Kerr, En Banc Ninth Circuit Holds That Computer Forensic Searches Are
like “Virtual Strip Searches” and Require Reasonable Suspicion at the Border, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 8, 2013, 3:33 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/03/08/en-banc-ninth-circuitholds-that-computer-forensic-searches-are-like-virtual-strip-searches-and-requirereasonable-suspicion-at-the-border/ [https://perma.cc/UBX4-GH2H].
Ultimately, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari and did not hear the case. See Cotterman v. United States,
134 S. Ct. 899 (2014).
172. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967.
173. See id. at 963–64 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541
(1985)); see also supra Part I.B.1.
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one’s life” and was “a substantial intrusion upon personal privacy and
dignity,” which required a degree of reasonable suspicion.174 As such, the
court analogized the examination of Cotterman’s computer to a strip search
and concluded that such a search “intrudes upon privacy and dignity interests
to a far greater degree than a cursory search at the border.”175 The court
explained that the arduous process involved in the forensic examination,
which included copying and searching Cotterman’s hard drive in its entirety
(including ostensibly deleted files), “is akin to reading a diary line by line
looking for mention of criminal activity—plus looking at everything the
writer may have erased.”176
Judge McKeown reasoned that “the uniquely sensitive nature of data on
electronic devices carries with it a significant expectation of privacy and thus
renders an exhaustive exploratory search more intrusive than with other
forms of property.”177 The court noted that the existence of cloud storage
makes searches “even more problematic” since the cloud may offer the
government access to sensitive data held on remote servers rather than on the
device itself.178
The Cotterman court believed that the amount of information stored on a
computer and the nature of that information justified its rule and observed
that “[a] person’s digital life ought not be hijacked simply by crossing a
border.”179 In dissent, Judge Consuelo Maria Callahan observed, “The
majority’s opinion turns primarily on the notion that electronic devices
deserve special consideration because they are ubiquitous and can store vast
quantities of personal information. That idea is fallacious and has no place
in the border search context.”180
2. United States v. Kolsuz
United States v. Kolsuz involved a traveler who was found with firearm
parts in his luggage and was charged with arms smuggling.181 After
defendant Hamza Kolsuz was detained at Washington Dulles International
Airport, customs officers took his phone, manually examined his recent
communications, and then transported the device elsewhere for an intensive
forensic review.182 That month-long search, per the court, “yielded an 896page report that included Kolsuz’s personal contact lists, emails, messenger
conversations, photographs, videos, calendar, web browsing history, and call
logs, along with a history of Kolsuz’s physical location down to precise GPS
coordinates.”183
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968.
Id. at 966.
Id. at 962–63.
Id. at 966.
Id. at 965.
Id.
Id. at 975 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 136 (4th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 139.
Id.
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Kolsuz moved to suppress the forensic report, arguing that investigators
should have been required to obtain a warrant before the search.184 After the
district court denied the motion and convicted him at trial, relying in part on
the report.185 Kolsuz appealed the denial and argued that his conviction
should be overturned either because the border exception did not extend to
his case186 or, in the alternative, because forensic device searches fall within
the category of highly intrusive or nonroutine border searches that require
greater individualized suspicion than a search of checked luggage would.187
Kolsuz argued that the search was unconstitutional because it failed to
meet the heightened standards required of especially invasive nonroutine
border searches.188 Writing for the majority, Judge Pamela Ann Harris noted
that “border searches of luggage, outer clothing, and personal effects
consistently are treated as routine, while searches that are most invasive of
privacy—strip searches, alimentary-canal searches, x-rays, and the like—are
deemed nonroutine and permitted only with reasonable suspicion.”189
Kolsuz argued that forensic searches are even more invasive than the physical
searches the court enumerated, relying on Riley v. California’s recognition
of the extraordinary volume of personal data that cell phones typically
carry.190
Judge Harris framed the result in Kolsuz as the logical extension of
Supreme Court border search precedent in light of the decision in Riley.191
The court noted that Supreme Court border search decisions have held that
“individualized suspicion is necessary to justify certain ‘highly intrusive
searches,’ in light of the significance of the individual ‘dignity and privacy
interests’ infringed.”192 The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court
“has not delineated precisely what makes a search nonroutine,” but it
nonetheless concluded—citing Cotterman—that “there was a convincing
case for categorizing forensic searches of digital devices as nonroutine” even
prior to the Riley decision.193
The Fourth Circuit indicated that Riley decisively foreclosed the argument
that forensic searches are permissible without reasonable suspicion, noting
that “the impact of Riley is plain enough that the government’s brief does not
seriously contest this point.”194 The court observed: “After Riley, we think
it is clear that a forensic search of a digital phone must be treated as a

184. Id. at 139–40. Kolsuz chose not to challenge the manual search of his phone because
that search yielded no evidence used against him at trial. Id. at 140 n.2.
185. See id. at 140–41.
186. Id. at 140–42.
187. See id. at 142–47. The court quickly dismissed Kolsuz’s first argument. See id. at
142–44.
188. See id. at 144–45.
189. Id. at 144.
190. See id. at 136–37.
191. See id. at 145–47.
192. Id. at 144 (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)).
193. Id. at 144–45.
194. Id. at 146.
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nonroutine border search, requiring some form of individualized
suspicion.”195
The Kolsuz decision expressly reserved the question of what standard
should govern manual device searches that “do not entail the use of external
equipment or software” because Kolsuz challenged only the forensic search
of his phone, which relied on external implements.196 Pre-Riley Fourth
Circuit precedent approved manual device searches without suspicion, as
does the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cotterman.197 However, Riley seems to
undermine this distinction: the case itself involved manual cell phone
searches.198
B. The Traditionalists Strike Back: The Eleventh Circuit
in United States v. Touset
Two weeks after the Fourth Circuit issued its decision in Kolsuz, the
Eleventh Circuit weighed in on the application of the border search doctrine
to electronic devices in United States v. Touset. The case arose from the
seizure—and subsequent forensic search—of several electronic devices
taken from a U.S. traveler at the international airport in Atlanta.199
Karl Touset ended up on law enforcement’s radar due to a series of
payments he made to people in foreign countries who were suspected of
distributing child pornography.200 Upon his return from an international trip,
CBP officers inspected Touset’s luggage—but the manual search revealed
no child pornography.201 The border officials, however, confiscated two
laptops, two external hard drives, and two tablets for further forensic
analysis, which revealed child pornography on the laptops and hard drives.202
The district court denied Touset’s motion to suppress the evidence
obtained from the border searches.203 Touset pled guilty to knowingly
transporting child pornography and subsequently appealed the denial of his
motion to suppress.204 On appeal, the government argued that “border agents
need no justification whatsoever to detain (in this case for seventeen days)

195. Id. But the court recognized that the government nonetheless had reasonable
suspicion to conduct a forensic search of Kolsuz’s phone. Id. at 141.
196. See id. at 146 nn.5–6.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547–48 (D. Md. 2014)
(justifying this two-tiered approach on the theory that manual searches can only invade as
much privacy as a law enforcement officer has time to invade, whereas a forensic search can
be conducted off-site at the officers’ leisure and entails making a lasting copy of the data
searched); see also Jared Janes, The Border Search Doctrine in the Digital Age: Implications
of Riley v. California on Border Law Enforcement’s Authority for Warrantless Searches of
Electronic Devices, 35 REV. LITIG. 71, 93–99 (2016).
198. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480–81 (2014); see also supra Part I.C.
199. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1230 (11th Cir. 2018).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 1231.
204. Id.
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and forensically search electronic devices of any American citizen returning
from abroad.”205
Touset followed another Eleventh Circuit case decided earlier in 2018,
United States v. Vergara,206 which also concerned the application of the
border search exception to a traveler’s electronic devices.207 In Vergara, the
defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained
from two cell phones seized by border agents following a cruise to
Mexico.208 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that
these searches required a warrant in the wake of Riley.209 In a brief opinion,
Judge William Pryor emphasized that Riley “expressly limited its holding to
the search-incident-to-arrest exception” and therefore did not impose a
warrant requirement for border searches.210 The defendant conceded that the
government had reasonable suspicion for the search, so the Vergara court
ultimately did not address the question of whether reasonable suspicion was
required for the searches.211
In Touset, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected the reasoning in Kolsuz
and Cotterman in holding that “precedents about border searches of property
make clear that no suspicion is necessary to search electronic devices at the
border.”212 Judge Pryor, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the Eleventh
Circuit’s understanding that Riley does not apply at the border.213 The panel
therefore remained “unpersuaded” by the routine-nonroutine search
distinction highlighted in Cotterman and Kolsuz.214
The Touset court emphasized that the Supreme Court rejected the
distinction between routine and nonroutine searches of property in FloresMontano.215 Judge Pryor noted that the Supreme Court “rejected a judicial
attempt to distinguish between ‘routine’ and ‘nonroutine’ searches” of a
vehicle, “as opposed to a more ‘intrusive’ search of a person.”216 The Touset
court cited this as decisive support for the argument that any routinenonroutine distinction has no place in border searches of property: “Property
and persons are different.”217 Judge Pryor also pointed out that the only
Supreme Court opinion requiring reasonable suspicion for a border search,

205. Id. at 1238–39 (Corrigan, J., concurring) (noting that this issue has never been before
the Supreme Court). The district court ultimately concluded that the government had
reasonable suspicion to conduct the search. Id. at 1237 (majority opinion).
206. 884 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 70 (2018).
207. Id. at 1310–11.
208. Id. at 1311.
209. Id. at 1312–13.
210. See id. at 1312.
211. See id. at 1313.
212. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1229 (11th Cir. 2018).
213. Id. at 1234 (citing Vergara, 884 F.3d at 1312).
214. See id.
215. See id. (citing United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)).
216. See id. at 1233.
217. See id. at 1234 (citing Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152).
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United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,218 involved the search of a person
rather than property.219
The Eleventh Circuit noted that its own precedent reflects an unwillingness
“to distinguish between different kinds of property.”220 The court ultimately
“s[aw] no reason why the Fourth Amendment would require suspicion for a
forensic search of an electronic device when it imposes no such requirement
for a search of other personal property.”221 If, the court reasoned, the Fourth
Amendment does not require reasonable suspicion for the search of a crew
member’s cabin on an incoming international cargo ship—“even though ‘[a]
cabin is a crew member’s home,’” which “receives the greatest Fourth
Amendment protection”—then it should not require any greater level of
suspicion for border searches of electronic devices.222
The panel explicitly rejected the notion that the storage capacity of modern
electronic devices justified imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement on
their searches at the border.223 Judge Pryor compared a modern electronic
device to “a recreational vehicle filled with personal effects or a tractor-trailer
loaded with boxes of documents”—neither of which triggers a requirement
of reasonable suspicion for a search at the border.224 The Touset court further
noted that “[b]order agents bear the same responsibility for preventing the
importation of contraband in a traveler’s possession regardless of advances
in technology.”225
The Eleventh Circuit found that its traditional standard for measuring a
search’s intrusiveness on the subject’s personal dignity was inapplicable to
border searches of property—including electronic devices.226 The Eleventh
Circuit traditionally measures “the ‘intrusiveness’ of a search of a person’s
body that requires reasonable suspicion ‘in terms of the indignity that will be
suffered by the person being searched.’”227 However, the court found that
this exercise is misplaced in searches of electronic devices.228 “Although it
may intrude on the privacy of the owner,” the court reasoned, “a forensic
search of an electronic device is still a search of property”—and both
Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent require no reasonable
suspicion for searches of property at the border.229

218. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
219. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233.
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. See id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d
720, 729 (11th Cir. 2010)).
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 1234 (finding that traditional factors contributing to the personal indignity
of the person being searched “are irrelevant to searches of electronic devices”).
227. See id. (quoting United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 1984)).
The Eleventh Circuit analysis focuses on: “(1) physical contact between the searcher and the
person searched; (2) exposure of intimate body parts; and (3) use of force.” Id.
228. See id.
229. Id.
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Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit was particularly unwilling to “create a
special rule that will benefit offenders who now conceal contraband in a new
kind of property”—in this case, child pornography on portable electronic
devices.230 The court believed that imposing a reasonable suspicion standard
would “create special protection for the property most often used to store and
disseminate child pornography.”231
The Touset decision, in its explicit rejection of Riley’s application at the
border and its express disagreement with the reasoning in both Cotterman
and Kolsuz, created a split among the circuit courts as to whether the
traditional border search exception properly applies to electronic devices.
III. EVALUATING DIGITAL SEARCHES AT THE BORDER
In light of the divergent approaches to electronic border searches across
the Ninth, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, this Part argues that the circuit split
should be resolved by requiring reasonable suspicion for all border searches
of electronic devices. This resolution is consistent with the Ninth and Fourth
Circuits’ recognition that forensic searches of electronic devices require at
least reasonable suspicion.232 The Supreme Court decisions in Riley and
Carpenter affirm the enhanced Fourth Amendment concerns implicated by
searches of digital devices.233 The spirit of these cases, coupled with an
understanding of the nonroutine nature of digital searches, demands that the
judiciary rethink the border exception as applied to searches of electronic
devices. Moreover, the imposition of a reasonable suspicion requirement for
electronic border searches would not adversely impact national security and
would fit more squarely with travelers’ Fourth Amendment interests.
Part III.A discusses why the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Riley should
carry weight in the context of searches of electronic devices performed at the
border. Part III.B argues that all border searches of electronic devices should
be considered nonroutine in light of the emphasis in Riley and Carpenter on
the substantial privacy interests that individuals possess in their digital data
stored on electronic devices. This Note concludes in Part III.C with a
discussion of recent CBP policy changes, which largely endorse the
recognition of heightened privacy interests implicated by searches of digital
devices.
A. Why Riley Matters at the Border
The Supreme Court in Riley recognized that searches of electronic devices
are distinct from searches of other forms of property and therefore trigger
greater Fourth Amendment concerns.234 The heightened privacy interests
implicated by searches of electronic devices—highlighted in Riley and
230. Id. at 1236.
231. Id. at 1235.
232. See infra Part III.A.
233. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Riley v. California, 134
S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014).
234. See supra notes 134–52 and accompanying text.
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Carpenter—should not go ignored at the border, where nearly every traveler
carries an electronic device.235
Traditional Fourth Amendment border doctrine balances substantial
government interests against the diminished privacy interests of a traveler.236
The concerns raised in Riley237 should tilt that balance less heavily in favor
of the government. The Court in Riley held, simply: “Get a warrant.”238 The
standard at the border should be: “Get reasonable suspicion.”239
Traditionalists insist that cell phones or laptops are no different than the
letters or ship cabins of old in terms of the government’s border search
authority—notwithstanding Riley’s observation that “a cell phone search
would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive
search of a house.”240 This discussion hinges on the question of whether cell
phones and laptops are distinct from ordinary “cargo,” which does not merit
special protection.
Traditionalists argue that the Supreme Court foreclosed this logic with its
decision in Flores-Montano, which rejected a reasonable suspicion
requirement based on intrusiveness for the border search of a vehicle.241
However, this argument does not properly account for the social and
technological changes since that decision was issued in 2004. The Court’s
opinions in Riley and Carpenter highlight the immense importance of digital
devices in our modern lives.242 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned in Touset that
travelers can always leave their devices at home if they want privacy, but
Riley properly recognized that cell phones are more nearly “an important
feature of human anatomy” than they are “just another technological
convenience.”243
Neither the depth of private information accessible on an electronic device
nor the traveler’s privacy interest in that information disappears at the border.
The Riley and Carpenter decisions took great care to note the strong privacy
interests inherent in electronic data—those decisions revisited longstanding
exceptions to the warrant requirement in light of advancing technology.244
To treat border searches of electronic devices as analytically equivalent to
the search of a traveler’s luggage would be to ignore the unique quality and
quantity245 of the data stored on digital devices.246 That the data stored on
now-ubiquitous electronic devices is virtually impossible for a layperson to
235. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 134–52 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
239. See Eunice Park, The Elephant in the Room: What Is a “Nonroutine” Border Search,
Anyway? Digital Device Searches Post-Riley, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277, 306 (2017).
240. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). Compare id., with United States v.
Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2018).
241. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 151–57 and accompanying text.
243. Compare Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484, 2494, with Touset, 890 F.3d at 1235.
244. See supra notes 140–57 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text.
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remove provides even more reason to recognize that an electronic device is
a distinct form of property, the search of which calls for individualized
suspicion.247
B. All Border Searches of Electronic Devices
Should Be Considered Nonroutine
The Riley Court rejected distinguishing between different levels of a cell
phone search.248 Similarly, courts should not distinguish between routine
and nonroutine levels of intrusiveness for a border search of a digital device.
In Cotterman, which was decided prior to Riley, the Ninth Circuit
maintained a distinction between permissibly suspicionless routine manual
searches and nonroutine forensic searches that require a greater level of
suspicion.249 The Kolsuz court did not reach the question of the justification
required for a manual border search of an electronic device, but the narrative
thrust of the opinion appears to call for individualized suspicion for all border
searches of cell phones.250
The fact that a cell phone may be on the person at the time of arrest does
not insulate the cell phone from the warrant requirement.251 The searchincident-to-arrest exception did not justify dispensing with the warrant
requirement before officers could search digital data on cell phones under
either the traditional concern for the officers’ safety or the fear of evidence
destruction.252 Likewise, the fact that a digital device is carried by an
international traveler should not exempt the digital device from the protection
of a reasonable suspicion requirement.
The circuit split can be resolved and reconciled with Riley by establishing
that all digital border searches should be categorized as nonroutine—and thus
should require reasonable suspicion. This treatment would recognize the
unique privacy interests in digital data highlighted in Riley and Carpenter253
without substantially upsetting the government’s traditional right to secure
and protect the border.254
C. DHS Agrees: Requiring Reasonable Suspicion for Device Searches
Will Not Harm National Security
Mandating reasonable suspicion for digital searches acknowledges
travelers’ expectation of privacy in digital devices at the border and does not
interfere with border agents’ ability to do their job. The Department of
247. See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text.
248. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492.
249. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
250. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 149 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring) (noting that the majority opinion “may be read by many courts to require
individualized suspicion for border searches of all cell phones period”); see also supra Part
II.A.2.
251. See supra notes 137–51 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
253. See supra Part I.C.
254. See supra Part I.B.
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Homeland Security recognizes this: in January 2018, DHS withdrew a 2009
policy authorizing warrantless, suspicionless searches of electronic devices
and replaced it with an updated policy calling for at least reasonable
suspicion for some device searches.255
The new DHS policy, which cites Cotterman among its influences,256
divides electronic-device searches into two categories: the basic search
(manual) and the advanced search (forensic).257 The 2018 policy requires
agents to have reasonable suspicion of “activity in violation of the laws
enforced or administered by CBP” or a “national security concern,” as well
as “supervisory approval,” to justify the advanced search.258 All other
searches require no individualized suspicion.259
The 2009 CBP policy, which governed border searches of electronic
devices at the time of the searches at issue in the cases discussed in this
Note,260 did not distinguish between a basic and advanced search and, in fact,
allowed any search to be performed without individualized suspicion.261
Likewise, the earlier policy permitted confiscation of an electronic device for
an on- or off-site search without any level of suspicion.262
CBP states that the new policy “will continue to protect the rights of
individuals against unreasonable search and seizure and ensure privacy
protections while accomplishing its border security and enforcement
missions.”263 That the agency adopted a policy requiring reasonable
suspicion for certain searches—even though the agency maintains that the
law does not require individualized suspicion264—amounts to a recognition
that a reasonable suspicion policy, for at least forensic border searches of
electronic devices, does not pose a substantial national security risk.
Reasonable suspicion imposes a minimal requirement, just the next level
up from no suspicion at all.265 In each of the circuit court cases profiled in
Part II, the court found that border agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct
searches of the travelers’ devices.266 Border agents rarely undertake lengthy,
expensive forensic searches of travelers’ digital devices for no particular
reason.267 The agency noted that its agents are professionals and often will
255. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 114, at 2. The 2018 CBP policy applies
to searches performed by CBP officers, not Immigration and Customs Enforcement or
Homeland Security Investigations agents. See Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC,
2018 WL 2170323, at *3 (D. Mass. May 9, 2018).
256. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 114, at 2 (“In general, border searches of
electronic devices do not require a warrant or suspicion, but certain searches undertaken in the
Ninth Circuit must meet a heightened standard.”).
257. Id. at 5–7.
258. See id. at 7.
259. See id. at 5–7; see also Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *3–5.
260. See, e.g., Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5.
261. See id.
262. Id.
263. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 114, at 1.
264. See id. at 2.
265. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 170, 195, 205 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 114, at 3.
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not conduct laptop searches unless facts and circumstances create
individualized suspicion—a standard not required by law.268
As the Kolsuz majority noted: “That the agency has chosen to adopt [the
Cotterman] requirements, of course, does not establish that they are
constitutionally mandated.”269 Travelers deserve to have the reasonable
suspicion standard for electronic searches recognized by the judiciary rather
than simply accepted as current DHS policy.270
CONCLUSION
It seems increasingly likely that the Supreme Court will need to resolve
how the border search exception applies to government searches of electronic
devices. In the meantime, thousands of travelers’ digital devices will be
subject to search at the border. The circuit split has significant impact on the
millions of travelers—many of whom travel with confidential or highly
sensitive business information—that pass through the U.S. borders each year
and the agents responsible for protecting those borders. Minimal harm will
result from imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement for border searches
of electronic devices. Calling for reasonable suspicion for border searches
of electronic devices properly recognizes both Riley’s Fourth Amendment
concerns regarding digital searches and the longstanding right of a sovereign
nation to protect its borders.

268. See id. at 2.
269. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146 (4th Cir. 2018).
270. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (“[T]he Founders did not fight
a revolution to gain the right to government agency protocols.”).

